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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 agreement, entered on February 8, 2011, Defendant Dennis 
0. Cox pled guilty to an amended charge of Injury to Child, Idaho Code§ 18-1501(1). (Rat 56). 
In exchange for a guilty plea, the State agreed that it would dismiss all other charges against Mr. 
Cox, that the Court would order a presentence investigation, consistent with Idaho Criminal Rule 
32, and the State would recommend to the Court no harsher penalty then recommended by the 
presentence investigator. (R at 56-58). The District Court was bound, by this Rule 11 agreement, 
to sentence no harsher than what was recommended by the presentence investigator. (R at 56-
58). The presentence investigator recommended incarceration in the presentence report dated 
April 20, 2011. (R at PSI). Correspondingly, the District Court sentenced to ten years unified, 
three years fixed, seven years indeterminate on or about June 30, 2011. (R at 99). A Rule 35 
motion is pending with the District Court. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
On or about October 7, 2010, Dennis 0. Cox was charged, via criminal complaint, with 
one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-1508, and 
one count of Rape, in alleged violation of Idaho Code§ 18-6101(4). (Rat 1-2). On or about 
October 26, 2010, a Stipulation for Own Recognizance Release Pursuant to Terms was submitted 
to the Magistrate Judge, replacing the $200,000 bond that was entered, and subjecting Mr. Cox 
to a Global Positioning System (GPS) monitor. (Rat 23-24). A preliminary hearing was held on 
November 16, 2010, and Mr. Cox was bound over to the District Court. (Rat 30-31). Mr. Cox 
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was arraigned before the District Court on November 30, 2010, and entered not guilty pleas. (R 
at 38). At the jury pretrial on February 8, 2011, the Court was presented a binding Rule 11 
agreement. (Rat 52). Mr. Cox pled guilty to one reduced count of Injury to Child, Idaho Code§ 
18-1501(1). (R at 52). The Court ordered a psychosexual evaluation (and full disclosure 
polygraph) with Dr. Kenneth Lindsey, and set sentencing for April 28, 2011. (R at 52-53). On 
April 7, 2011, by request of Mr. Cox, the Court continued sentencing until May 26, 2011. (Rat 
64). 
At the sentencing hearing on May 26, 2011, Mr. Cox objected to the presentence report 
because it contained impermissible conjecture and speculation, prohibited by I.C.R. Rule 32. (Tr. 
at 35-36). Initially, the Court granted Mr. Cox's objection, struck the presentence investigation, 
and granted a new presentence investigation in another jurisdiction. (Tr. at 35-36). 
Subsequently, after argument was made in chambers by the State, the Court overruled its prior 
order to strike and allowed the State to call the presentence investigator to testify (at a later date) 
as to why she found the conjecture and speculation reliable in making her recommendations. 
(Tr. at 38). The Court requested briefing on the arguments. (R at 88-92). 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court allowed the presentence investigator to 
testify as to why she relied on conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 44). The Court overruled Mr. 
Cox's request that the PSI be stricken. (Tr. at 112). The Court then redlined portions of the PSI, 
thus striking those portions from the record. (Tr. at 112). The Court refused to disqualify itself, 
and then entered a sentence of ten years unified, three years determinate, seven years 
indeterminate. (various transcript, Rat 97). 
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C. STATEMENTOFFACTS 
On September 25, 2010, E.S. presented to local law enforcement to report alleged sexual 
abuse against Defendant Dennis 0. Cox (hereinafter "Dennis" or "Mr. Cox"). (R at 10). 
According to her report, Dennis, approximately seven to eight years prior to disclosure, had 
inappropriate contact of a sexual nature while E.S. was exercising at Dermis's gym. (R at 10). 
She also stated that the she and Dennis had performed mutual sexual acts on one another, prior to 
she reaching the age of 18. (R. at 10). She also alleged that Dennis forced her to have sex with 
him after she had turned the age of eighteen. (Rat 11-12). 
As a result of these allegations, Dennis was arrested in Salt Lake City (where he lived) 
and was held for three weeks pending a bond hearing. 1 (R. at 18). Ultimately, Mr. Cox was 
released on his own recognizance, but was required to wear an ankle monitor during his release. 2 
(Rat 23-26). A contested preliminary hearing was held on November 16, 2010, and Dennis was 
bound over to District Court. (R at 32). After the first of the year (2011), the Parties began 
discussing potential resolutions of the case. Ultimately, the Parties agreed to a binding Rule 11 
agreement, by which Dennis would plead guilty to one count of Injury to Child (reduced charge 
from Lewd Conduct with a minor under the age of 16), the rape charge would be dismissed, and 
that the State would recommend no harsher than what the presentence investigator would 
recommend. (R at 56). On February 8, 2011, the binding Rule 11 agreement was submitted to 
the Court, and relying on this agreement, Dennis pled guilty to one count of Injury to Child, and 
1 Bond was set at $200,000 by a magistrate that ultimately recused himself due to a conflict of interest. (R at 18, 20). 
2 Dennis never had a single violation of his GPS OR release, which was noted and acknowledged at his sentencing. 
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Dennis was required to undergo a psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Kenneth Lindsey. (Rat 52-
59). 
On May 11, 2011, the Court was sent a psychological evaluation from Dr. Lindsey.3 In 
the psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Lindsey relied upon a polygraph dated April 6, 2011, from 
polygrapher Kirk Nelson.4 In Dr. Lindsey's May 11, 2011 report, due to unexplained deception 
in Mr. Cox's polygraph, Dr. Lindsey stated that Mr. Cox was an indeterminate risk for sexual 
offending in the future. Id. Dr. Lindsey indicated that there was no forcible rape against the 
victim (based on the polygraph results). Id. Dr. Lindsey indicated there were no other minor 
victims (based on the polygraph results). Id. Dr. Lindsey stated, "However, I am able to 
determine what his minimum risk would be, or the case that what we know about him today 
based on his disclosures is essentially all there is to know .... I rate Mr. Cox minimal risk level (is 
lower bound risk level) as moderate-low." Id. Due to the lack of a non-deceptive polygraph, Dr. 
Lindsey recommended, in this initial May 11, 2011 report, that Mr. Cox be incarcerated for 
community protection purposes. Id. This psychosexual evaluation was provided to the 
presentence investigator. (R at Presentence Investigation). 
As a result of the incomplete polygraphs, a hearing was held (at Mr. Cox's request) to 
continue the sentencing in order for Dennis to submit to an additional polygraph to see if the 
deception would be resolved. (Rat 64). The State vigorously opposed the motion, but the Court 
granted the motion to continue. (R. at 64). Accordingly, the Court continued sentencing to May 
26, 2011. (Rat 64). On or about May 4, 2011, Dennis presented to Kirk Nelson for a follow-up 
3 Sealed exhibit, psychological evaluation of Dennis 0. Cox dated May 11, 2011. 
4 Sealed exhibit, April 6, 2011 document Nelson's Truth Verification Testing and Investigations, LLC. 
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polygraph.5 This second polygraph resolved some of the issues regarding deception, but not all. 
Id. Dennis still showed deception on two questions: 
"Are you know purposely hiding any important part of your sexual history from me?" 
and; 
"After your divorce were you the one who initiated contact with E.S. ?" 
Id. 
The presentence investigation was provided to defense counsel on or about May 19, 
2011. (R at Presentence Investigation Report) On May 26, 2011, the matter came on for 
sentencing before the District Court. (Tr. at 18). Dennis objected to the presentence 
investigation as containing inappropriate conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 19). The objection 
was made as follows: 
Counsel: Your Honor the Idaho Criminal Rule 32 states, "However, while not all 
information in a presentence report need be in the form of sworn testimony and be 
admissible in trial, conjecture and speculation should not be included in the 
presentence report." That is a direct quote from Idaho Criminal Rule 35 [sic] by 
which this presentence investigation was conducted. 
Now I understand that a presentence investigator, pursuant to Rule 32, may 
request information concerning social history and a marital status, but Your 
Honor, there are assertions made in this report, particularly excerpts from letters 
from ex-wives, letters from other individuals that have allegations that are frankly 
and completely inappropriate for a presentence investigation. These allegations 
and assertions go far beyond obtaining a social history; far beyond obtaining his 
marital history. There are unsubstantiated allegations contained and implications 
of abuse. There are unsubstantiated allegations and factually inaccurate assertions 
of animal cruelty. There are implications of wrong doing. Furthermore, I think 
that there is an inappropriate implication of religious impropriety that should 
5 There is a report attached to the May 11, 2011 psychosexual evaluation in the sealed content of the file. 
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never have been mentioned. Simply put, they have never been addressed or at 
issue before this Court for sentencing. 
And where this objection is particularly relevant, Your Honor, is that prior to this 
individual conducting the presentence investigation, the presentence investigator 
was told about the Rule 11 agreement in this case. So she knew that the Court 
would be bound by what she recommended, and whether she was jaded by the 
false, stinging and flat out allegations, Your Honor, all I can say is I can go 
through line item by line item the excerpts and the objections that we have in this 
presentence investigation and I can emphasis the areas of conjecture and 
speculation. And I recognize that the Court has already read the presentence 
investigation, and I know that this Court has to make a decision regarding 
sentencing, and I am not really all that interested in going through these items and 
putting a billboard over the top of these false allegations .... 
Your Honor I am asking for a new presentence investigation and to postpone this 
sentencing and to have a new [sic] presentence investigation underwent by a 
different officer, possibly even in a different jurisdiction where this inappropriate 
material is not considered .... 
Of the presentence report there is an excerpt from the letter that was submitted by 
Marcie Schwartz. There are allegations in here of, "I firmly believe that Dennis is 
an experienced social predator who has years to perfect his destructive craft. 
They insulate Dennis from suspicion and have enabled him to live a double life. 
He can prey on the weak, the vulnerable, the young, in order to satisfy his most 
salacious appetites while maintaining a false image of devoutness and decency. 
Remove Dennis from the proximity of those he would exploit and ravage. What 
[sic] should this man be allowed to perpetuate this great misery in the lives of 
even more victims?" 
The Court: And I will agree that there is a lot of conclusory type of language in 
there without any facts to back it up. 
Counsel: Correct. 
The Court: Are you of the view that I cannot ascertain whether there is factual 
support for any of this and give it the appropriate weight as I consider this 
allegation and consider the sentencing in this matter? 
Counsel: Where it is especially problematic in this case, is that we entered into a 
Rule 11 where the Court would be bound to not sentence any harsher than the 
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recommendations of the presentence investigator. Now it is not that I don't have 
faith in this Court to give that conjecture and speculation the appropriate weight. 
It isn't that, but I don't necessarily have that same faith in the presentence 
investigator, and this information was considered-it was specifically cut and 
pasted from these letters and put into that presentence investigation and there is 
no question that jaded and tainted this investigator's recommendations. (Tr. at 19-
28). 
After hearing arguments by both Parties, the Court went in to recess, reviewed relevant 
case law, and returned with a ruling. (Tr. at 30). The Court ruled verbally: 
The Court: . . . The Court has-this matter is set to proceed to sentencing today 
with respect to Mr. Cox's previous plea of guilty to the crime of Felony Injury to 
Child, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-1501(1). The Court has been presented 
today before sentencing could occur a motion by defendant's counsel, Mr. Aaron 
Thompson correct me if I am wrong, basically asking that the Court strike the 
presentence investigation report in this matter, based upon claim be defendant that 
it contains information that is inappropriate in presentence investigation reports 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32, specifically subsection e one of that Rule. 
It has also asked that the Court order that a new presentence investigation report 
be completed incident to that motion. Is that a correct statement of the motion 
that has been made at this time? 
Counsel: Yes, Your Honor, that is accurate. 
The Court: The state has opposed that motion. The Court in considering this 
motion has taken this matter under advisement, has gone into chambers, I have re-
reviewed the Rule 11 Agreement that was entered into this matter. I think the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement does have some interplay with respect to this motion. As 
I understand the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in this matter, the State agreed to amend 
the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child under the Age of Sixteen Years, 
in exchange for Mr. Cox's plea of guilty to the charge of Felony Injury to Child. 
It is further agreed that this agreement shall be presented to the Judge pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11. If Judge Brown does not accept this agreement, Mr. Cox 
has the ability to withdraw his plea of guilty and proceed to trial on the initial 
charges that were brought. 
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The terms and conditions of the plea agreement further provide-I can't find it 
right now, but further provide that the State as well as the sentencing court in this 
matter will be bound to follow the recommendations of the presentence 
investigator who completes the presentence investigation and has the benefit of 
the psychosexual evaluation. The Court and the State would then be bound by her 
recommendations. 
The Court's understanding of that plea agreement, of course, is that the Court 
could do nothing more than what was recommended by the presentence 
investigator. So if the presentence investigator recommended probation, the 
Court could do nothing more than that without affording Mr. Cox an opportunity 
to withdraw his guilty plea. If the presentence investigator recommended a 
retained jurisdiction, the Court could not impose prison with affording Mr. Cox an 
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. So the presentence investigator and the 
recommendations of that presentence investigator play a very significant role in 
this sentencing process pursuant to the terms and conditions of the plea 
agreement. 
The Court incident to the plea agreement and the plea entered by Mr. Cox 
subsequent to the submission of the plea agreement ordered that a psychosexual 
evaluation, along with a presentence investigation report be completed in this 
matter. Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, the contents of a 
presentence investigation report may include a number of items to provide the 
Court with a sufficient information, background information, criminal 
information, to make an informed judgment concerning the sentence that should 
be imposed. Specifically Rule 32(b) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides that the 
Court can give consideration to the presentence investigation report should 
include information, including a defendant's prior criminal record, as well as a 
defendant's social history, including family relationships, marital status, age, 
interests and activities. The Court certainly interprets this provision of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules to include a background information and social history that would 
solicit information and input from ex-wives and family members, and so the 
Court sees nothing inappropriate or out of the ordinary with respect to the request 
of presentence investigator going to Mr. Cox's ex-wives and asking them for 
information that may be beneficial and may be pertinent under the Idaho Criminal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or excuse me under the Idaho Criminal Rules to assist in 
the preparation of a presentence investigation report. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(10) further provides that the presentence investigator's 
analysis of the defendant's condition. That analysis of the defendant's condition 
contained in the presentence report shall include a complete summary of the 
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presentence investigator's view of the psychological factors surrounding the 
commission of the crime or regarding the defendant individually which he 
investigator discovers. 
So certainly those areas identified and sought out through discussions and social 
history with ex-wives and family members are appropriate considerations for the 
Court to taken into consideration and the presentence investigator to include into a 
presentence investigation. 
The Court is also given consideration to the Court of Appeals decision in State of 
Idaho v. Sensenig, that is found at 110 Idaho 83. In that case, the Court of 
Appeals stated, "Under subdivision ( e) of this Rule, information in a presentence 
report can be stricken only if no reasonable basis exists to deem the information 
reliable or the information is simply conjecture and speculation." Obviously that 
is the contention of the defendant in this matter that there are significant portions 
of the presentence investigation report specifically significant portions of two of 
the ex-wives of Mr. Cox that contain a great deal of conjecture and speculation. 
This issue has been discussed further in the case of State v. Mauro. This is found 
at 121 Idaho 178. This is a Supreme Court decision. In that case, the Court stated 
as follows, "While Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e) provides that the presentence report 
may include information of a hearsay nature where the presentence investigator 
believes that information is reliable, including material which would have been 
inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence applicable at trial." The Rule precludes 
the inclusion of conjecture and speculation. We conclude that a substantial 
amount of information quoted above without some explanation by the presentence 
investigator as to why he believes that information is reliable, was too speculative 
or too conjectural to be considered in sentencing. The Court goes on to state that 
without an explanation from the presentence investigator why he believed that the 
hearsay information was reliable or an indication by the trial court that he was not 
relying on it, we conclude that the presentence report contained too much 
speculation and conjecture and too little support for why the presentence 
investigator believed that the hearsay information was reliable to comply with 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32. 
These two cases provide the Court with some guidance but there is still a 
component of this that is troubling to the Court. As stated in Mauro, the Court is 
free at sentencing to state why I am not relying upon or why I reject certain 
information that may be conjectural or speculative in nature, and I have the ability 
and would be more than able to do what, rather than strike the report and do 
something new with respect to this. The problem that is in place in this 
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particular situation is that the interplay with the binding Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement locks this Court in to any recommendation-locks the State in to 
any recommendation that were to be made by the presentence investigator 
and therefore, his or her call somewhat controls where the Court can go with 
respect to this particular sentencing. That creates a component that wasn't 
present in State v. Mauro which further complicates this analysis. 
The Court does conclude that much of what is contained in the letters from 
Mr. Cox's two ex-wives is purely conjectural in nature and is speculative. 
The Court does conclude from my review of the presentence investigation report 
as well as those letters that much of what that is, is just coniecture and are 
just claims by the ex-wives supported by no factual information that the 
presentence investigator could rely upon. 
More importantly for the appellate analysis the presentence investigator has not 
stated any reasons in the presentence investigation report itself why she believes 
that those statements are reliable or should be considered as part of the record in 
this sentencing. Based upon this matter, based upon this Court's concern 
regarding its interpretation of Rule 32 or the Idaho Criminal Rules as well as the 
case law interpreting that, specifically the State v. Mauro case and the interplay 
that the language of that decision has with respect to the fact that this is a binding 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, and that the recommendations of the presentence 
investigator are controlling upon the State's recommendations as well as the 
sentencing discretion of the Court. The Court does feel that there are questions 
regarding the legitimacy of the presentence investigation report. 
To assure that this matter is not subject to appeal and reversal on appeal, the 
Court feels that I have no choice at this point in time but to grant the 
Defendant's motion to order that a new presentence investigation be 
completed in this matter. I am going to ask that the presentence investigation 
report be completed by a presentence investigator in the seventh judicial district. 
I am going to order that this be stricken and I am going to-before I complete my 
ruling I want to see counsel in chamber regarding on aspect of this Rule. 
(Tr. at 30-36) (emphasis added). 
After a meeting with the State and defense counsel in chambers, the State 
convinced the Court to allow the presentence investigator come and defend her use of the 
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conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 37-40). Therefore, the Court rescheduled the matter 
for another sentencing date. (Tr. at 40). 
The Court also held that either party had the ability to contact Nicole Osborn, the 
presentence investigator. (Tr. at 39). The Court also requested a submission of briefing 
pertaining to the Idaho Criminal Rule 32 objection. (Tr. at 40). 
Between May 26 and June 30, 2011, Mr. Cox underwent and additional polygraph 
examination at his own expense. (R at 83). Mr. Cox's counsel sent an email, at the 
conclusion of the new polygraph, to the psychosexual evaluator and carbon copied the 
email to the State's attorney. (R at 83). In the email, counsel requested that the 
psychosexual evaluator review the updated polygraph, and, if the professionalism and 
authenticity met the psychosexual evaluator's standards, requested that Dr. Lindsey 
update his report. (Rat 83). Immediately thereafter, the State filed a Motion to Disallow 
Consideration of Third Polygraph Examination by Court Ordered Evaluator. (R at 79). 
Cox responded with an Objection to Motion to Disallow Consideration of Third 
Polygraph Examination by Court Ordered Evaluator. (Rat 85). After hearing argument, 
the Court denied the State's request to prohibit Dr. Lindsey from considering the third 
polygraph examination. (Rat 94). 
Correspondingly, Dr. Lindsey did review the third polygraph, and all though he 
did have some reservations regarding the polygraph, found it to be acceptable and relied 
upon it for an updated psychosexual evaluation. (See June 24, 2011, psychosexual 
evaluation report). In this updated psychosexual evaluation report, Dr. Lindsey stated 
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that a moderate to low risk of sexual re-offense. (Id). On page 4 of Dr. Lindsey's 
recommendations, Dr. Lindsey stated, "Addendum report findings do not appear to 
indicate the need for incarceration of Mr. Cox for community protection purposes. Of 
course the Court may choose to incarcerate him for other judicial purposes." (Id at 4). 
Correspondingly, the addendum psychological evaluation (June 24, 2011) was forwarded 
to the presentence investigator, Nicole Osborn. She testified that she received it, reviewed it, 
that it made no impact on her recommendations at all. (Rat 80-81). The Court, prior to hearing, 
reviewed the briefing of the Parties on the I.C.R. Rule 32 issue. The Court then allowed the 
State to present Nicole Osborn has a witness, in her capacity as a presentence investigator. (Tr. at 
46). She testified that she was aware of Idaho Criminal Rule 32, and that she had been trained 
how to prepare appropriate Rule 32 reports. (R at 47). She was asked the question on direct 
examination: 
Q: What about the issue of about speculation and conjecture? That-I am not 
asking you to interpret the legal meaning of that but are you aware the Rule 
regarding speculation and conjecture within presentence investigation reports? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What is your understanding of that? 
A: That again is difficult to understand, but to me if someone just calls out of 
the blue and makes a statement I am not going to accept that unless I verify it. 
(Tr. at 54) ( emphasis added). 
Although she is not a trained psychologist/psychiatrist, and had never met Mr. Cox 
before, she made interpretations regarding Mr. Cox's body language and took an immediate 
disliking to Mr. Cox. (Tr. at 63-64). She repeatedly stated that she felt that conjecture and 
speculation differed from an opinion. (Tr. at 83). When cross examined as to the material in her 
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presentence investigation report from the ex-wives, she did not believe that it was conjecture and 
speculation. (R at 84-85). She was the sole arbiter as to what to include in her presentence 
report. (Tr. at 86). She states that she gave much of the material she "cut and pasted" into the 
presentence report "very little weight". (Tr. at 86). Later, she admitted that the portions that she 
"cut and pasted" into the report were "significant." (Tr. at 87). Also, for her recommendations, 
she stated she relied on the psychosexual evaluation from Dr. Lindsey. (Tr. at 89). But, when 
the updated recommendations came in, she disagreed with reliance upon Dr. Lindsey, and the 
updated recommendations. (Tr. at 94). 
She did no independent research to "verify" whether Mr. Cox was a "sociopath", a 
"predator", or someone that is obsessed with "woman, pornography and sex". (Tr. at 88). She 
also disregarded the polygraphs by which Mr. Cox showed no deception as to molesting his 
daughter, other victims, and guilty of other sexually related crimes. (Tr. at 89-90). She was 
aware that of the Rule 11 agreement in the case, and that Court was bound by her 
recommendations. (Tr.at 91). Mr. Cox's counsel argued: 
Counsel: Your Honor, it is the same argument that was made before. The Rule is 
clear. It states, "That this type of material, the conjecture and speculation should 
not be included in the presentence report." And I pointed in my briefing, and I 
think the statement that that stuff is not conjecture and speculation, is just 
ludicrous. There is absolutely nothing in the record. There is absolutely nothing 
in this PSI that supports that fact that he was an experienced sexual predator; that 
he leads a double life; that there are multiple victims. This is an extremely 
inflammatory language, and for someone to say, "Look I can compartmentalize 
all that and not rely upon that in making a conclusion in a case like this." I would 
submit that as impossible ..... 
Counsel: It is one thing to receive a letter and then it is entirely a different thing to 
pick and choose portions of that letter, put it in your presentence report, and then 
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say, "I don't rely upon it." ... She cut and pasted it into the report. She says now 
that she didn't rely upon it, yet it is in her report. The Rule is clear that it is not 
suppose to be there. It is not supposed to be there and why? We need to talk 
about a little bit about the policy as to why is that. There [are] actually two really 
good policy reasons why that stuff shouldn't be in there. The first policy reason 
is, is that one, the ultimate hearer on that, the Court, should not be relying on that 
information that is found in the presentence report ... That is the one policy 
consideration. The second policy consideration is and it is one that we made in 
the ... we want a fair and unbiased report, and when we get conjecture and we get 
speculation and we include it in our report and we look at the accumulation of all 
the information that we are bombarded with, and we-there is absolutely no way 
that she could divorce herself from these types of allegations. And there is 
nothing to rely on for those allegations. There is nothing to rely on. He passed the 
polygraph on all those issues, and there really-there have not been any other 
victims that have come forward and said-stated these things. I mean he is called 
a sexual predator in here-that is pretty inflammatory language, and it is 
conjecture and speculation. It has no place in this presentence report. 
Couple that with the fact that with this Rule 11 binding plea agreement that she 
was aware of, and I understand that she was made aware of from my own client, 
but she was going to be made aware of that anyway. She needed to maintain 
fairness and unbiasedness (sic) throughout this process. It was extremely 
imperative for this presentence investigation to do that, and Your Honor, we 
simply believe that given this information, that fact that she stated that she really 
didn't rely on that but she did rely on it, it is insignificant, but yet it is significant. 
She gives the Court significant pause in whether to go forward today, and frankly, 
we think this should be submitted as we asked in the last hearing, to submitted to 
a separate PSI with a specific instruction to not include that information in the 
report and not to consider that information. 
(Tr. at 97-99). 
The Court stated, in its ruling: 
I will note on the record that sometime during the course of this process, Ms. 
Osborn contacted my office, and was concerned about the number of people that 
were wanting to make comment and be included in the presentence investigation 
report. My office instructed her that she should conduct the presentence 
investigation in accordance with Rule 32 and with the accordance of her normal 
procedure. So at the early stages of this matter, Ms. Osborn was inundated with a 
lot of people who expressed a lot of opinions about this issue and it was a very 
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difficult task, and I certainly recognize the struggle and the difficulty Ms. Osborn 
had with respect to completing this presentence investigation report. 
(Tr. at 104-105). 
It must be noted that these concerns referenced by the Court were not included in the 
Presentence Report. The reader does not know the tenor of these statements and whether they 
had impact on her conclusions. 
The Court found that much of the objected to material contained conjecture and 
speculation. (Tr. 107-109). The Court stated," .. .I cannot allow these statements to exist and be 
in conformity with Idaho Criminal Rule 32." The Court struck the letters (and the excerpts) from 
the presentence investigation, however, did not address the statements may or may not have had 
on the presentence investigator as to her ultimate conclusions. (Tr. at 110-112). The Court ruled 
that it could disregard the statements in the presentence report and sentence accordingly. (Tr. at 
12). The Court then addressed the impact of the Rule 11 agreement. (Tr. 113-117). Mr. Cox's 
counsel then requested that the Court disqualify itself based on that it had reviewed the stricken 
material. (Tr. at 117). The State objected. (Tr. at 117-118). The Court denied the Motion. (Tr. 
at 118-120). 
The Court promised that it would not consider the prejudicial statements, and likened the 
considerations to the exclusion of the material to a motion in limine in which decisions are made 
on the evidence after hearing the evidence. (Tr. at 118-119). 
Sentencing then proceeded, evidence was presented, and the Court entered ruling. 
Ultimately, at the conclusion of arguments, the Court sentenced Dennis to a unified term of ten 
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years, with three years fixed, seven years indeterminate. (Tr. at 179). A Rule 35 motion is 
pending before the District Court, and is scheduled to be heard on January 12, 2012. 
II. STANDARD OF APPEAL 
Each of these issues are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. (See 
Idaho Code§ 19-2521; I. C.R. 32). Under is standard, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 
inquiry. The appellate court examines whether the lower court rightfully perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion, and 
consistently with any legal standard applicable to specific choices; and whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. Absence is showing that the district court abused its 
discretion and the appellate court will not disturb the challenge decision on appeal. State v. 
Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d 265, 925 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 
Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989). 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Did the Trial Court err in failing to strike the entire presentence investigation based 
upon the presentence investigation containing inappropriate conjecture and 
speculation, and by failing to order a new presentence investigation? 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(l) states "The presentence report may include information of a 
hearsay nature where the presentence investigator believes the information is reliable, and the 
court may consider such information. In the trial judge's discretion, the judge may consider 
material contained in the presentence report which would have been inadmissible under the rules 
of evidence applicable at a trial. However, while not all information in a presentence report need 
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be in the form of sworn testimony and be admissible in trial, conjecture and speculation should 
not be included in the presentence report." (Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(l)) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of inappropriate conjecture and speculation 
in State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991). Mauro pled guilty to an offense in 
December, 1987. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 182. An initial presentence report was created, and that it 
recommended probation. Id. Due to federal charges pending, the matter was continued much 
later, and as a result, a new presentence report was created. Id. The new presentence report had 
extensive detail listing Mauro as a major drug dealer, and recommended extensive incarceration. 
Id. 
At the sentencing, Mauro's counsel strenuously objected to the inclusion of the new 
information in the presentence report. Id. As is the case in hand, Mauro argued that there was 
impermissible conjecture and speculation included in the presentence report, and that the PSI 
constituted "an innuendo as to other crimes". Id. 
Apparently, in Mauro, the presentence investigator relied on information from the United 
States attorney's office in conjunction with the Federal case that was pending. Id at 183. The 
impermissible conjecture and speculation relied upon in the presentence report contained 
information of intensive drug dealing, prostitution, and other negative criminal innuendo. Id at 
182. The presentence investigator did nothing but review the file, and did not provide a 
substantial basis for why it was included in the presentence report, nor was any indication given 
as to why it was reliable. Id at 182-183. The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
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The fact that much of the information came from the files of the United States 
attorney's office does not mean that it is per se reliable. That source does not 
necessarily ensure that the information is not conjecture or speculation. Without 
an explanation from the presentence investigator why he believed that the hearsay 
information was reliable, or indication by the trial court that he was not relying 
on, we conclude that the presentence report contained too much speculation and 
conjecture, and too little support for why the presentence investigator believed 
that the hearsay information was reliable, to comply with I.C.R. 32(e). 
Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the district 
court for resentencing after first obtaining a new presentence investigation report 
in compliance with I.C.R. 32(e). 
Id at 183. (emphasis added). 
Correspondingly, defense counsel made motion to disqualify the judge based on his 
review of the "slanderous" comments. The court denied said motion. Id at 183. The Supreme 
Court held that the motion to disqualify did not comply with LC.R. Rule 25, and that judge made 
statements that he would not consider the inappropriate comments. 
Mostly, Mauro is on point with Mr. Cox's case. In Dennis's case, the presentence 
investigator, Nicole Osborn, acquired letters from various sources, including Dermis's ex-wives. 
Dennis's ex-wives were not victims, nor did they have any independent or individual knowledge 
of the facts involved with this case. Apparently, with an axe to grind, the ex-wives designated 
Mr. Cox as a sexual monster, predator, and a person that has abused many children in the past, 
and will do so in the future. The real evidence, including the polygraph examinations and 
psychosexual evaluation, do not support these contentions in any fashion. 
The Court, after reviewing the presentence investigation, concluded that these slanderous 
allegations were conjecture and speculation. In fact, at first, the District Court agreed to strike 
the entire presentence investigation, to allow a new presentence investigation to be conducted 
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absent the conjecture and speculation, with a presentence investigator from a different 
jurisdiction. The Court stated that the legitimacy of the presentence investigation was suspect. 
Furthermore, the Court correctly stated that due to the interplay with the Rule 11 agreement, this 
case presented interesting and complex issues. 
Upon argument from the State, the Court relented on the ruling to strike, and gave the 
presentence investigator an opportunity to testify to the Court to explain why she included the 
conjecture and speculation in the presentence report, and why such reliance was appropriate. 
The testimony given by the presentence investigator at the hearing wa<; enlightening. 
Ms. Osborn indicated that she had fifteen years of experience and had in-depth training as to how 
to interpret Rule 32. She stated she would not include conjecture and speculation without 
verification, yet did nothing to verify except take it at face value. However, she could not grasp 
the basic concept of what "conjecture and speculation" is, and would not concede that the 
statements made by the ex-wives were inappropriate in this setting. During cross-examination, 
she made several inconsistent statements about whether she relied on the letters (and the 
conjecture and speculation) to render her ultimate recommendations. 
At first, she seemed to downplay that the information that she acquired from the ex-wives 
were just ex-wives with "axes to grind". However, instead of just leaving the letters as 
attachments to the presentence investigation, she took the most inflammatory pieces of 
conjecture and speculation, and "cut and pasted" them directly into the presentence report. 
When a<;ked if these statements were significant, she initially stated they were not, and then 
changed her mind and indicated that they were significant. When asked exactly what she relied 
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upon to find those conjecture and inflammatory statements reliable, she could point to nothing in 
the file that supported the contention that Dennis was a sexual predator, with multiple victims, 
was psychotic, and if left free, would abuse children. She stated that because one of the ex wives 
was married to him for 10 years, that she could proffer an "opinion" as to his sexual deviance. 
There was absolutely no indicia of reliability for including these statements in the presentence 
report. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 850 (2011), 
the PSI" ... [T]he report is to be a neutral document and not an opportunity to simply advocate 
for the State's position. However, the primary purpose of a PSI is to assist the district court in 
sentencing." Id. 
This presentence report was extremely important in this case. Courts request to give the 
sentencing court all of the information necessary to fashion and foster a just sentence. The 
policy behind the I.C.R. Rule 32 report is to give the court the full picture, in an unbiased 
fashion, as to the history of the defendant, the ability of the defendant to be rehabilitated, and the 
extent of retribution, as it extends to the theories of punishment. The presentence investigator 
does not work for the State, and the presentence investigator does not work for the defense. The 
presentence investigator is charged with keeping her objectivity and neutrality, and to give the 
court a clear idea of the defendant, and what sentence should be appropriate. 
Here, the presentence report was even more important in that the she had tremendous 
control over the outcome of the case. The Rule 11 Binding Plea Agreement bound the Court to 
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sentence no harsher than the recommendation of the presentence report, and, that the State was 
not allowed above and beyond the recommendations of the presentence report. 
Here, as was admitted by the Court in its ruling on whether to exclude the presentence 
report, Ms. Osborn was bombarded with information. Although we do not know the chronology 
of this "bombardment", it is likely that she received the letters and had telephone calls with the 
ex-wives, who were seeking vengeance, prior to ever meeting with Dennis Cox. Given the 
information that she received, she had to believe she was going to interview a skilled and proven 
sexual predator - before she met with him at all. She would have been naturally pre-disposed to 
dislike Mr. Cox. 
Furthermore, she was aware of the Rule 11 plea agreement, and the power that she held. 
She took an immediate disliking to Dennis Cox by virtue of his "body language" and perceived 
"arrogance" in her personal interview. These feelings may have been impacted by the 
preconceived notions of the conjecture and speculation that she received alleging that Dennis 
was some type of sexual monster. 
The presentence investigator relied heavily upon the psychosexual evaluation of Dr. 
Lindsey. She quotes, on page 15 of the document, every negative reference from Dr. Lindsey's 
report that she could find. However, during cross-examination, when she was asked specifically 
if she had received the addendum report by which Dr. Lindsey was no longer recommending 
prison, she emboldened and was immoveable in her recommendations. 
By virtue that she "cut and pasted" the inflammatory provisions directly into here report, 
and she would not admit that it was conjecture and speculation when crossed, gives clear 
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indication that she did in fact rely upon it. She included information of a nature that the judge 
should have never reviewed. She couldn't possibly have read that and not been moved by it. 
Furthermore, consider if the ex-wives were called to testify at the sentencing hearing as 
to these "opinions". Counsel would have objected to the relevance, and, if the District Court 
were to rule properly, the "opinions" would have been kept from introduction. Why? These 
opinions are immaterial in the sentencing context. From a policy consideration, we simply do 
want to allow a judge to be biased on inflammatory and unreliable information. 
After the presentence investigator testified, the District Court Judge agreed that the letters 
from the ex-wives (and excerpts pasted into the report itself) contained too much conjecture and 
speculation, and were inherently unreliable. Rather than striking the presentence investigation, 
to see if after the conjecture and speculation was removed, if a different presentence investigator 
would render different conclusions, the Court elected to "red line" the letters in the portions of 
the presentence investigation referenced by the objection. This was done even though the Court 
previously stated the legitimacy of the report. Despite these previous reservations, the Court 
allowed the conclusions to remain. 
Unfortunately, this did not remedy the error, and this caused harm to Dennis Cox. A 
house built of faulty materials and a weak foundation will inevitably fall. By allowing the 
conclusions to remain, Dennis's Rule 11 Agreement was deemed null and void, and worthless. It 
is quite possible that if Dennis knew, prior to entering this plea, that the presentence 
investigation was going to be conducted in such a fashion, that he would never been enticed to 
enter the agreement, and would have taken his chances at trial. 
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A presentence investigator who reviews, and relies, on such statements should have been 
precluded from making any recommendations. The Court erred when it did not the strike the PSI 
in its entirety and allow a new presentence investigation report. This case is extremely similar 
to Mauro and the remedy should have been exactly the same. 
In other cases, which have applied the Mauro reasoning, such as State v. Dowalo, 122 
Idaho 761, 838 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Siva, 127 Idaho 387, 901 P.2d 494 (1995), 
the case at hand is distinguishable. In those cases, the courts upheld the failure to strike the PSI 
on the grounds that presentence investigator provided a state as to why they felt the hearsay or 
conclusory statement was reliable. Here, the presentence investigator did not believe the 
statements to be reliable, yet in reaching her conclusions, still relied upon them. She relied upon 
this apparently by cutting and pasting the relevant provisions into the text of the presentence 
report. 
Another case, State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950 (Ct. App. 2010), involves inappropriate 
inclusion of material of a conjecture and hearsay nature in presentence investigation. In this 
case, the PSI included in an unsubstantiated report of sexual abuse perpetrated by a defendant, 
which was wholly unreliable. Id at 961. The court agreed that the information was unreliable 
and believed that the material should be stricken. Id at 961. Apparently, the Court in the case at 
bar relied on Molen, and State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 971 P.2d 327 (1998). The court in 
Molen indicated that it would not consider the prohibited material, and then found that the 
appropriate procedure was to "redline" the report in which he physical retraction of the material 
is taken from the presentence investigation. Id at 961-962. 
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However, in Mr. Cox's case, this procedure fails. The binding Rule 11 agreement was 
relying on the presentence investigator to comply with Rule 32, and to not rely upon 
inappropriate material in reaching her conclusions. Therefore, the inquiry is different. This is 
not a matter of whether the Court can strike the material, and disregard it. It is a matter of 
whether the presentence investigator could. In this case, based on the testimony that the 
presentence investigator gave, it is obvious that she could not. Therefore, the presentence 
investigation should have been stricken, in its entirety, and a presentence investigation, without 
the inflammatory material being included, should have been ordered. 
B. Did the Court err by failing to disqualify itself, upon motion by counsel, after it had 
reviewed prejudicial material in the presentence investigation report? 
Here, after the Court ruled that it would strike the prejudicial conjecture and speculation 
from the presentence report, the Court was asked to disqualify itself based on its review of the 
material. The Court denied the motion on the grounds that it could compartmentalize the 
inappropriate material in the presentence report, and not consider it. 
In Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803, 815-16 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the standards for disqualification of a judge: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2)(A)(4) provides for disqualification for 
cause if the presiding judge is "biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the 
case in the action." In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 
1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, 793 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held 
that to be disqualifying, the alleged bias or prejudice "must stem from an 
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other 
than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." For a number of 
years Idaho appellate courts followed the Grinnell standard. Samuel v. Hepworth, 
Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000); State, 
Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 133 Idaho 826, 829, 992 P.2d 1226, 1229 
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(Ct.App.1999); Hays v. Craven, 131 Idaho 761, 763, 963 P.2d 1198, 1200 
(Ct.App.1998); State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 
(Ct.App.1994); Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302, 306, 870 P.2d 9, 13 
(Ct.App.1994); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27, 29, 813 P.2d 366, 368 
(Ct.App.1991). However, both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court have abandoned this approach. In Liteky v. United States, 510 
U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), the Court held that "[t]he fact 
that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings 
is not a necessary condition for 'bias or prejudice' recusal, since predispositions 
developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is 
it a sufficient condition for 'bias or prejudice' recusal, since some opinions 
acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's 
view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice." Id. at 554, 114 
S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 490 (emphasis in original). 
Recently, in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court, following the reasoning of Liteky, implicitly overruled the prior 
Idaho cases. Our Supreme Court held that whatever the source of the bias or 
prejudice, it must be "so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair 
judgment," that "unless there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either 
from an extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no 
basis for judicial recusal." Id. at 791-92, 229 P.3d at 1153-54 (emphasis added). 
The Court stated that "the standard for recusal of a judge, based simply on 
information that he has learned in the course of judicial proceedings, is extremely 
high." Id. at 792, 229 P.3d at 1154. 
The Court in Doe, although ruling for a reversal on other grounds, advised in the remand 
that the Court should consider disqualifying itself for the future proceedings. Id. 
As stated, the Court read, in a presentence report information that was wholly 
inappropriate, to the level that the Court took the unusual step of redlining and deleting the 
material. The material deleted was inflammatory. It was highly prejudicial. Reading it has to 
have an impact on the reader. 
Here, the Court likened this to a motion in limine, by which the Court reviews material 
possibly inadmissible to a jury, to determine whether the evidence should be introduced. 
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However, there is a large distinction. In a sentencing scenario, the Court is the ultimate finder of 
fact. In the scenario the Judge addressed, the jury is the finder of fact. The court simply plays 
the referee as to what evidence complies with the rules. When the Court determines whether 
someone spends 3 years in prison, and the choice is the Court's alone, we must be absolutely 
certain that the court can be fair and unbiased. 
Based on the Court's failure to disqualify itself, this court should reverse the sentence, 
and set for re-sentencing, with a new judge that has not reviewed the prejudicial material. 
C. Did the District Court err when it sentenced Dennis Cox to ten years unified, three 
years.fixed, seven years indeterminate? 
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed whether a sentence was appropriate, in State v. Carrasco. 
It held: 
When a sentence is challenged on appeal we examine the record, focusing on the 
offense and the character of the off ender, to determine if there has been abusive 
sentencing court's discretion. State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 808 P.2d 429 (Ct. 
App. 1991). Where a sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). The Defendant bears the 
burden to show that sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary 
objective of protecting society and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992); State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). An abuse of 
discretion will be found only in light of governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 
497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993). 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 338, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d (Ct. App. 1988), the Court addressed 
whether the district court abused its in pronouncing its sentence. The court stated in citing the 
Toohill decision, "A term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary at the 
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time of sentencing to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. A sentence longer than 
necessary for these purposes is unreasonable and may represent a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In support of mitigation, the defendant argued that he was a first time offender, and that 
his role in the crime was minor. Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 352. Several people came forward and 
testified as to his good reputation. Id. Regardless of the sentence being a legal sentence, the 
Carrasco Court found that the penalty was harsh for a first time offender. Id at 352. In a 
concurring opinion, Justices Burnett and Swanstrom stated, "Nevertheless, it remains our 
responsibility at the appellate level to review the facts independently, focusing not only upon the 
nature of the offense but also upon the character of the offender." Id at 353-354 (citing State v. 
Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982)). The court analyzed the theories of 
punishment, and applied the theories of punishment to the facts at hand - and reduced his 
sentence. Id at 354-355. 
In the case at hand, Dennis Cox was a fifty-three year old man at the time of sentencing. 
He had nary a criminal charge prior to these allegations. He was truly a first time offender under 
a Toohill analysis. In mitigation, the psychosexual evaluator recommended probation. Dennis 
gave a heartfelt apology for his conduct and the pain that he had caused the victim. The 
psychosexual evaluation, by virtue of the polygraphs, indicated that there were no other victims, 
and Mr. Cox was at a low risk of re-offense. The charges were reduced from lewd conduct and 
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rape to one single charge of injury to child. The polygraph indicated that many of the allegations 
that the victim were making were simply untrue. 
The District Court seemed to have a natural predisposition against crimes of a sex related 
nature. Some of comments in the verbal ruling indicate this. The Toohill decision, and the other 
cases such as Carrasco, emphasize that each crime is different, and a term confinement must be 
no longer than necessary to achieve the theories of punishment. Given Dennis's lack of criminal 
history, and other mitigating factors, a unified sentence of ten years, with three years being fixed 
was excessive given all the circumstances. This Court should modify this judgment and remand 
to the district court address this inappropriate sentencing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the presentence report should have been stricken in its 
entirety. The presentence investigator included conjecture and speculation in her report. This 
violated Rule 32 I.C.R. The Court ruled that the speculation and conjecture did in fact violate 
Rule 32. Due to the binding plea agreement being so hopelessly intertwined with the 
presentence report, the remedy chosen did not correct this error. The Court was initially correct 
in its ruling to strike the PSI, and when it ordered a new one. 
Furthermore, when Mr. Cox requested for the Court to disqualify itself, based on the 
Courts review of the extrajudicial statements in the PSI, to insure fairness, the motion should 
have been granted. 
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Finally, given the Toohill factors, the sentence was overly harsh and inappropriate given 
that Dennis was a first time offender, and was capable of being rehabilitated pursuant to the 
psychosexual evaluation. 
For all of these reasons, the sentence should be reversed, and remanded to the Court, with 
a new sentencing judge, with an order for a new presentence investigation from a new 
jurisdiction. 
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